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Abstract. In this paper we report recent results on modelling the impact of cy-
ber-attacks on the resilience of complex industrial systems. We use a hybrid 
model of the system under study in which the accidental failures and the mali-
cious behaviour of the Adversary are modelled stochastically, while the conse-
quences of failures and attacks are modelled in detail using deterministic mod-
els. This modelling approach is demonstrated on a complex case study - a refer-
ence power transmission network (NORDIC 32), enhanced with a detailed 
model of the computer and communication network used for monitoring, pro-
tection and control compliant with the international standard IEC 61850. We 
studied the resilience of the modelled system under different scenarios: i) a 
base-line scenario in which the modelled system operates in the presence of ac-
cidental failures without cyber-attacks; ii) several different scenarios of cyber-
attacks. We discuss the usefulness of the modelling approach, of the findings, 
and outline directions for further work. 
Keywords: Critical Infrastructures, Power Transmission Network, IEC 61850, 
stochastic modelling. 
1 Introduction 
Security of industrial control systems (ICS) used to control critical infrastructures 
(CI) has attracted the attention of researchers and practitioners. The evidence is over-
whelming that, the services offered by CI are somewhat robust with respect to single 
component failures of the underlying network. The reaction to multiple and cascade 
failures, however, is much more difficult to understand and to predict, especially 
when cyber attacks are taken into consideration. Dependencies and interdependencies 
between the elements of CIs are an important source of risk and risk uncertainty.  
Although there are similarities between the ICS and the information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) systems, important differences between the two exist [1]. 
High availability and real-time response to events in industrial systems make some 
defenses against cyber-attacks, widely used in ICT (e.g. patching), inadequate for 
ICS. The literature rarely acknowledges other differences between the ICT and ICS, 
which make the detection of failures/cyber-attacks in the ICS easier  to achieve than in 
the ICT. The processes that an ICS controls are generally either directly observable or 
reliable methods for indirect measurement exist. For instance, whether a power gener-
ator is connected to the power grid or not, is either directly observable or can be es-
tablished reliably using sophisticated software tools such as state estimators.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the problem of quantitative 
model based risk assessment studied in the paper. In section 3 we provide a descrip-
tion of the modeling approach we take to model cyber-attacks on ICS. A brief de-
scription of the case study used in the paper to illustrate the approach is also provided. 
Section 4 summarizes our findings, section 5 – the related research. Finally, section 6 
concludes the paper and outlines directions for future research. 
2 Problem statement 
In the past we developed a method for quantifying the impact of interdependencies 
between CI [2], which we called Preliminary Interdependency Analysis (PIA). PIA 
starts by a systematic search for CI interdependencies at a fairly high level of abstrac-
tion; interdependencies which might otherwise be overlooked. In a separate study [3] 
we demonstrated that although using a high level of abstraction is useful, the risk 
assessment results are, in general, quite sensitive to the chosen level abstraction. PIA 
allows the modeller to create hybrid models of the modelled infrastructures and 
choose the level of detail that suits the specific study. The software tools developed to 
support the PIA method allow the modeller to quickly build complex hybrid models 
which combine: i) stochastic models of a system and its constituent elements,  ac-
counting for functional, spatial and other stochastic dependencies between these ele-
ments, and ii) domain specific deterministic models, necessary in case a high fidelity 
analysis is sought, e.g. flow models, typically operate on a subset of modelled ele-
ments.  
Cyber security of ICS has become a topic of active research (important contribu-
tions are summarised in the Related Research section). Its practical importance, the 
need for empirical studies and the difficulties with these, have been widely recog-
nised.  
A common problem with cyber security research is that it concentrates on security 
incidents in the ICT/ICS, while the real impact of successful attacks is rarely quanti-
fied. As a result, quantitative risk assessment is difficult. While such an approach is, 
to some extent, justified in the ICT systems (for instance, how one assesses the impact 
of information theft is an open debate), with industrial systems the real impact of a 
cyber incident may be relatively easy to quantify. For instance, the impact of losing a 
generator in a power system as a result of a cyber-attack will vary between 0, in case 
other generators can provide additional power to compensate fully for the lost genera-
tor, to losses due to not supplying power to some consumers, in case the spare power 
generation capacity of the other generators in the network is insufficient to meet the 
current power demand. PIA models are well suited for quantitative risk assessment, as 
they model, stochastically, both the controlled plant and the ICS. Until recently, how-
ever, PIA had not been used to explicitly address cyber security concerns. In [6] we  
extended the PIA method by adding an Adversary model and building on the recent 
work by others in this direction, e.g. the ADVISE formalism [4]. The focus of this 
paper is to study the impact on network service of different attack strategies – where 
such strategies might be employed by naïve or more sophisticated attackers – and to 
highlight the effectiveness of some precautionary measures that a network operator 
could undertake.     
3 Solution 
3.1 The system under study 
We use a non-trivial case study of a power transmission network to demonstrate 
the analysis one can undertake with the extended PIA and to evaluate how well the 
method scales to realistically complex industrial systems.  
   
Fig. 1. NORDIC 32 power system topology.  
The system model was developed by the FP7 EU project AFTER 
(http://www.after-project.eu/Layout/after/). It is based on a reference power transmis-
sion network, NORDIC 32, enhanced with an industrial distributed control system 
(IDCS) compliant with the international standard IEC 61850 “Communication net-
works and subsystems in sub-stations”. Illustrations of NORDIC 32 and of the archi-
tecture of a sub-station are shown in Fig. 1. A detailed description of the case study is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a short summary is provided below. 
The transmission network (Fig. 1, diagram on the left) consists of a large number 
of transmission lines which connect 19 power generators and 19 loads. All connec-
tions of lines, generators and links are done in 32 sub-stations. Each sub-station is 
arranged in a number of bays. Each bay is responsible for connecting a single element 
– a line, a generator or a load – to the transmission network.  
The sub-stations are assumed compliant with IEC 61850. Fig. 1 (the diagram on 
the right) shows an example of a sub-station. The other sub-stations have similar ar-
chitecture but may contain different numbers and types of bays. Some sub-stations 
may have generators and/or loads, and all sub-stations connect transmission lines. 
The sub-stations are connected via a sophisticated ICT infrastructure (not shown 
for lack of space), which includes a number of control centres, communication chan-
nels and data centres.   
Each bay is responsible for (dis)connecting one element from the transmission 
network. This is achieved by a set of elements – relays and electronic devices1. In this 
case study the electronic devices can be one of the following two types – either a 
protection device or a control device. The function of the protection devices is to dis-
connect power elements from the transmission network, e.g. as a result of overloading 
of a line or of a generator. The control devices, on the other hand, are used to connect 
or disconnect power elements from the network and are typically used by either the 
operators in the respective control centres or by “special purpose software” (SPS) 
designed to undertake some of the operators’ functions automatically.  
Each sub-station has a Local Area Network (LAN), which allows the local devices 
to communicate with each other. The LAN is protected from the rest of the world by a 
firewall. Legitimate traffic in and out the sub-station is allowed, of course. 
Each of the protection or control functions (with respect to the individual bays) is 
available whenever there exists a minimal cut set of available equipment supporting 
the function. In the absence of a minimal cut set the respective function itself becomes 
unavailable. A predicate defining the minimal cut sets is provided with each function: 
some functions are achieved using functionally redundant components, others are not. 
We model the entire system probabilistically, by building a stochastic state ma-
chine for each element included in the system description. Each state machine has 
three states – “OK”, “Fail” and “Disconnected”. Depending on the element type, its 
model, in addition to a state machine, may include specific additional non-stochastic 
properties. For instance, the model of a generator will have a property defining the 
maximum output power; the model of a load - an additional property defining the 
power consumed, etc. The interested reader may find further details in [2].  
3.2 Modelling cyber-attacks 
Now we describe an Adversary model, added to the model of the system. 
For the system under study we assumed that each sub-station will have a dedicated 
firewall (indicated by the “brick wall” in Fig. 1) which isolates the sub-station from 
the rest of the world. We also assumed that an intrusion detection/prevention system 
(IDS/IPS) would monitor the traffic in the sub-station’s LAN. When the IDS/IPS 
detects illegitimate traffic it blocks the Adversary from accessing the assets located at 
the sub-station. 
Our study is limited to the effect of a single type of attack on system behavior: a 
cyber-attack via the firewall of a sub-station. The Adversary model we developed is 
                                                          
1
 IEC 61850 distinguishes between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED), functions and nodes. 
Nodes are responsible for implementing a specific function (i.e. protection or control) and 
can involve several IED.  
adapted from a recent publication [5]. The model is shown in Fig. 2 using the Sto-
chastic Activity Networks (SAN) formalism.  
This model assumes that the Adversary is initially idle (represented by the SAN 
place labeled “Idle”). 
With some regularity, defined by the activity Attack_interval, the Adversary 
launches a cyber-attack on the system by trying to penetrate the Firewall (modeled in 
Fig. 2 by the activity Firewall_attack) of one of the 32 sub-stations defined in 
NORDIC-32 model. 
 
Fig. 2. Model of Adversary applied to NORDIC 32.  
The selection of the sub-station to attack is driven by either a uniform distribution, 
defined over the 32 sub-stations (“Indiscriminate attacker profile”) or by a non-
uniform distribution defined in a way to capture the preferences of the Adversary. We 
discussed elsewhere [6] the difference between the cases of an indiscriminate Adver-
sary and an Adversary with preferences. In this paper, we limit the study to an indis-
criminate Adversary. Under the current model we also assume that the firewalls of all 
sub-stations are equally easy/difficult to penetrate. In fact, the SAN model in Fig. 2 is 
incomplete: it does not show how the Adversary chooses a sub-station. This model 
shows the steps that follow the Adversary’s initial selection of a sub-station to attack:  
─ The Adversary may target each of the firewall configuration rules. The decision of 
which rule to attack is modeled by the activity Firewall_attack. In Fig. 2 we as-
sume that there are 4 rules to choose between, which is just an example. The model 
assumes that the rules are equally likely to be chosen by an attacker – the proba-
bilities associated with the outputs of the Firewall_attack activity are all set to 0.25.  
─ Once a rule is selected (modeled by the places Rule_1 – Rule_4), the Adversary 
spends time trying to break the selected rule, which is modeled by the activities At-
tack_1 – Attack_4, respectively. This effort may be successful or unsuccessful. In 
the case of a failed attempt, the Adversary returns to an idle state and may launch 
another attack later, likely to be on a different sub-station.  
─ In the case of a successful penetration through the firewall, the state “Penetrated” is 
entered, which has three alternative options for the Adversary to proceed2:  
                                                          
2
 The actions that and Adversary can undertake are not modeled in detail in Fig. 2. The specific 
logic of successful attacks, however, is implemented by the plug-ins to the PIA simulator.  
 to switch off a generator (in case a bay exists in the sub-station, via which a 
generator is connected to the grid),   to switch off a load (in case a bay exists in the sub-station via which a consumer 
is connected to the grid) or   to either disconnect a line from the grid (selecting at random one of those con-
trolled by the sub-station) or to tamper the line breaker device associated with 
the line by changing the threshold of power at which the breaker will trip the 
particular line. 
─ If the Adversary succeeds, she leaves the sub-station. In other words the Adversary 
under this model affects at most one bay per attack. This choice is modeled by the 
instantaneous activity Next_step, which returns the Adversary to the state “Idle”.  
─ IDS/IPS is modeled by the activity IDS_detection, which is enabled if the model 
state is “Penetrated”. This activity competes with the activities selecting which bay 
will be targeted by the Adversary. The Adversary may be detected before she 
switches off a bay. As soon as the activity IDS_detection fires, the attack is aborted 
and the Adversary is returned to “Idle”.  
A successful attack may trigger further activities in the system. For instance, any 
malicious switching-off of a bay may be “detected” when a new power flow calcula-
tions is run. If so, via the respective control function, an attempt is made to reconnect 
those bays which have been disconnected by the Adversary.  
In the presented Adversary model we assume that all timed activities are exponen-
tially distributed. We studied the effect of the rates of some of these distributions on 
the selected utility function (which is discussed next).  
4 Findings 
4.1 Rewards 
We were interested in measuring the effect of cyber-attacks on the service provided 
by the system under study. We chose to compare the behavior of a base-line model, 
i.e. a model without cyber-attacks, with the behavior of the models in which cyber-
attacks are enabled (“system under attack”). The comparison is based on specific 
rewards (utility function). We selected, somewhat arbitrarily, the length of a simula-
tion run to be the equivalent of 10 years of operation. We use different rewards all 
linked to the supplied power – supplied power, in particular, has been used in the 
analysis of power systems by others [5]. Clearly, for each simulation run, the supplied 
power varies over time to form a continuous-time stochastic process. We study the 
following three statistics of this process, each capturing a different aspect of interest: 
─ The average power supplied during a simulation run. This would be lower than the 
nominal power of 10,940 MW. The average will vary between simulated runs, and 
we look at the distribution of this average over a number of runs. 
─ Similarly, we compute the standard deviations per run and then look at the distri-
bution of this statistic over the runs,  
─ We also estimate the distribution over the simulation runs of the minimum supplied 
power and use the percentiles of this distribution as an indication of how large the 
outage/blackout can be.  
4.2 Studies 
The studied system is non-trivial. It consists of more than 1500 state machines. 
With the chosen parameterization, based on input from domain experts, we observed 
a significant number (~4000 … 40,000) of events over a single simulation run. Many 
of these events require power flow calculations, which take considerable time to com-
plete. Similarly, following overloads or generator failures, active “control” is required 
to find a new stable system state. Searching for a stable state is another time consum-
ing algorithm. As a result, a single simulation run takes approximately 5 min to com-
plete. Obtaining results with high confidence would require a large number of simula-
tion runs. All our results are based on 200 simulation runs with each of the scenarios3.  
In a recent paper [6] we presented the results related to attacks targeted at switching 
off a single bay: a generator, load or a line by an Adversary who selects the substa-
tions indiscriminately or who targets with high probability the important assets such 
as large generators large loads. In this paper, instead, we concentrate on attacks which 
do not lead to immediate visible consequences. An example of such attacks is chang-
ing the tripping threshold of a line breaker. More specifically, we assume that an Ad-
versary can tamper with an intelligent protection device by setting the value of trip-
ping the respective line to 110% of the line load at the time the attack. Clearly, a suc-
cessful attack will have no immediate effect, but any subsequent accidental failures, 
which lead to power flow changes, may trigger a trip of the respective lines unneces-
sarily. A number of successful attacks over time may lead to multiple protection de-
vices being tampered with, which in turn may lead to large cascades. In addition we 
introduce a model of inspections of the modeled system. An inspection checks if the 
tripping values of the protection devices are set correctly. If a deviation from these is 
detected the respective thresholds are restored to correct values. 
We completed several simulation campaigns which are summarized as follows:  A base-line scenario. This represents the NORDIC 32 with only accidental failures 
of network components possible and no cyber-attacks.  A scenario of attacks with immediately visible effect. The base line scenario is ex-
tended by adding cyber-attacks which, if successful, lead to a switch-off of a single 
bay (i.e. a transformer, or a load) in a substation. We model an intelligent adver-
sary, who targets only the 5 largest loads and the 5 largest generators. The frequen-
cy of the attacks is varied: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily.   Scenarios of attacks with no immediately visible effects. The base-line scenario is 
extended with attacks which, if successful, lead to a change of the tripping thresh-
old of a single line in the bay selected by the Adversary. We distinguish between 
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 We obtained the Relative Standard Errors (RSE) for all statistics. The essential conclusions of 
the paper are based on statistically significant observations.  
two groups of such scenarios: 
─ A scenario without inspections. The tripping thresholds are never checked by 
the network operator and restored to their correct values. 
─ Scenarios with periodic inspections. The intervals between inspections are as-
sumed exponentially distributed, and the rate of inspections is varied: yearly, 
monthly, weekly and daily.  
4.3 Results 
Each of the scenarios described above for a particular parameterization (rates of at-
tacks and inspections, if applicable) was simulated 200 times. We summarize our 
findings below. 
Base line vs. attacks with an immediately visible effect  
Successful attacks of this type lead to switching off either a generator or a load. 
The empirical distributions characterizing the supplied power are shown in Fig. 3. 
      
Fig. 3. Base line scenario vs. the scenario of attacks on the most important generators and 
loads: empirical distributions of Mean and Standard Deviations of the supplied power.  
Attacks with no immediately visible effect 
In this study the attacks, if successful, lead to an alteration of the tripping levels of 
protection devices of a single line in a bay chosen by an Adversary. Fig. 4 illustrates 
the impact of the inspection frequency on the supplied power.  
The plot shows quite clearly that unless inspections are applied, very significant 
amounts of power will be lost – the average of the supplied power varies between 
5000 and 8000 MW. The explanation is quite simple – unless the tripping thresholds 
are restored to their correct values, they will be gradually reduced by the successful 
attacks and many lines in the power network will operate with a significantly reduced 
capacity. Loosing such a large amount of power is unlikely to remain unnoticed and 
some inspections, as a measure of protection against attacks of this kind, are likely to 
be put in place. Not surprisingly, inspections change the picture dramatically – the 
lost power is now significantly reduced to levels comparable with those shown on 
Fig. 3. Increasing the frequency of inspections results in ever greater average power 
supplied (i.e. the distributions are accumulating towards the right in Fig. 4) and reduc-
ing variability in power supplied (i.e. accumulating towards the left in Fig. 4). 
           
Fig. 4. The impact on supplied power of the attacks frequency: empirical distributions of the 
Mean and Standard Deviation of the supplied power.    
Comparison of the attacks  
So far we looked at the impact on the supplied power of the different attacks, vary-
ing their frequencies. Now we compare the scenarios with different attacks.  
    
Fig. 5. Attacks with immediately visible effects vs. attacks without immediately visible effects. 
The two attacks used are very different in their nature: one seeks an immediate ef-
fect by switching either a load or a generator, while the other only creates a potentiali-
ty for losses (i.e. hazards) which will manifest themselves only if a disruption of pow-
er flow occurs, e.g. by a failure of an element in the power system. They are also dif-
ferent in the way the Adversary chooses the targets – with the immediately visible 
effects, the Adversary concentrates on the major targets (the largest generators and 
loads). With the attacks with no visible effects the Adversary selects the targets at 
random. In these circumstances one is tempted to expect that the more intelligent 
Adversary (who targets the largest assets) is likely to create more significant disrup-
tion than the attacks by the less sophisticated attacker. Is this so? We studied this 
problem and present our findings in Fig. 5, using the distribution of the average sup-
plied power and the distribution of the minimum supplied power resulting from the 
attacks of the two types. The distributions obtained for the base line scenario are also 
included in the plot. In the plots of the average supplied power the base line and the 
scenario with attacks by an intelligent attacker are indistinguishable (both overlap on 
the far right of Fig. 5). Under the attacks of the second type, even with precautionary 
daily inspections carried out by the network operator, the average supplied power is 
lower. In other words, this type of attack, undertaken by a non-discriminating attack-
er, leads to more serious losses than the targeted attack with visible effects by an in-
telligent attacker. This ordering was not obvious before the study. The right hand half 
of Fig. 5 further corroborates this observation. The two right-hand-side curves in the 
plot represent the base lie scenario and the scenario of intelligent attacks with visible 
effects, respectively. Quite clearly, the distributions of the minimum supplied power 
under the attacks with no immediately visible consequences are stochastically worse 
than under the targeted attacks with immediately visible effects. In other words, for 
any given value of power supply, the chances for, at most, this amount to be supplied 
by the system is greater under attacks with no immediately visible effects, compared 
with the chances under targeted attacks with visible effects. 
5 Related Research 
Different aspects of SCADA system security have been studied extensively.  
Influential reports by both the Department of Homeland Security [7] and the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [1] provide a comprehensive 
discussion of SCADA architectures and best practice approaches for their security.  
Stochastic models have been used in the past to address, specifically, the cyber se-
curity of industrial control systems. For instance, Ten et. al [5] offer a model based on 
stochastic Petri nets, adapted for cyber security on power transmission systems. The 
study is similar to ours, except that Ten et. al do not provide a base line study and 
primarily concentrate on cyber-attacks under a fixed model parameterisation. In our 
study we explore the space of plausible parameters (sensitivity analysis). Ten et al. 
also use an extreme model of consequences of a successful attack, assuming that all 
bays of a compromised sub-station will be disconnected.  
The ADVISE formalism [4] offers an alternative approach to stochastic modelling 
of a rational Adversary. The utility function used by ADVISE is computed based on 
the preferences of an adversary and on the likelihood of an attack being detected. The 
modelling approach allows for non-determinism – in terms of an outcome of a par-
ticular step in an attack –  but any decision that the adversary would need to take dur-
ing the attack is driven by her preferences, defined in the model statically. As a result, 
the adversary would take the same decision even if she is presented with the same 
choice multiple times during an attack. The formalism allows one to study one at-
tacker and attack-strategy at a time; comparison of the impact of multiple, different 
attackers  and attack-strategies requires building separate models and studies. While 
the illustration of our approach dealt with a single attack too, there is no constraint in 
our approach which prevents us from combining simultaneous attacks by different 
adversaries. The utility function used in ADVISE is normalised and is defined in the 
range [0, 1], which may require some effort to link the model with the specific context 
of study in order to give domain experts – such as  power engineers, as in the example 
we studied – a clear interpretation of the findings from the modelling. Our approach 
allows one the freedom to define the reward in a way that is most suitable for the 
stakeholders.  
An interesting approach to modelling an adaptive adversary is developed by Marti-
nelli et al [8]. The key idea there is captured by a graph describing the steps that an 
adversary could take, including “stepping back” in case of unsuccessful attack.  
Nash equilibrium has recently become popular in cyber security research, e.g. [9], 
the key idea being that under fairly broad assumptions, the existence of the worst 
consequences from cyber-attacks can be established without having to define, in de-
tail, the attacks in specific contexts. Such studies, however, operate at a high level of 
abstraction and the findings from them may be difficult to interpret in practice.  
6 Conclusions 
We described an approach to stochastic modelling of industrial control systems in 
which both accidental failures and cyber-attacks are treated in a unified way:  
─ stochastic state machines are used to model the behaviour of the elements of the 
ICS which allow the modeller to capture the accidental failures; 
─ malicious behaviour of an Adversary (i.e. cyber-attacks) are modelled by stochastic 
state machines too, and these capture the behaviour of the Adversary (their knowl-
edge/preferences about the assets under attack and the particular actions they 
would take once access to the assets is acquired); 
─ the dependencies between the behaviour of the modelled elements – including 
accidental failures and the effects of successful cyber-attacks – are captured explic-
itly via a set of additional models: either deterministic – such as power flows – or 
probabilistic – e.g. stochastic dependencies between the system elements. 
We illustrated our approach on a non-trivial case study and report on the initial 
findings from a useful sensitivity analysis of system resilience on the parameters of 
different threats and defenses. We also compare two types of attacks using as a crite-
rion how they affect the amount of supplied power.  
We chose relatively simple attacks to illustrate the approach. Extending the work 
to more sophisticated scenarios of attacks is straightforward. Every new attack type 
would require a new model of the Adversary, which would define the steps an Adver-
sary should take in launching an attack, a relatively simple task. Modelling combined 
attacks by multiple Adversaries would be also trivial: the system model would in-
volve several Adversary models.  
We envisage extending the work in a number of ways. Expanding the work on 
modeling the adversaries at the same level of abstraction, i.e. ignoring the specifics of 
the communication protocols used in the ICS. A number of attack scenarios are of 
immediate interest. An obvious extension of the adversary model used in this paper is 
one in which the adversary may attack more than one sub-station, e.g. until she even-
tually gets caught. Scenarios of simultaneous and/or coordinated attacks by multiple 
Adversaries (SWARM attacks) are important in practice, too. Modelling such attacks 
will require more complex models of an Adversary. 
Last but not least, the recent work to re-engineer the tools supporting the PIA 
method makes it suitable to “study the future”, i.e. for studies, in which the system 
under study evolves. The changes may concern the system topology, the model pa-
rameters and, not least, the impact of technological development and various hypothe-
ses about how cyber crime may evolve over time.   
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